UK considered China nuclear attack to defend the Big Lychee from the Commies back in 1961. 20 years later Maggie decided to defend the Falklands without bombing Buenos Aires. And ironically 30 years later Mother England was busy creating new forms of quasi-citizenship to avoid a "flood" of Hong Kongers leaving the place pre-handover. That's tough love.
South China Morning Post always digs up old pointless peices of news in desperate support of its Bejing brown nosing. In case you all forgot tomorrow is July the first and any attempt to distract Hong Kongers from China reality like recent Bejing "breaking News" ban and other usual such control measures is always supported by the brothers in red. It's all sooooo predictable.
There were also people in the United States government who proposed that Cuba should be invaded and possibly nuked during the cold war.
But neither China nor Cuba were nuked/invaded. Why? Because there is no single person who as absolute power in either the US or England. I'm not sure what the intentions of running this article were, but if one intension was to make the people of China think that England is an eternal boogie-man, it could seriously backfire by show just how good the system is because they didn't do anything of the sort. If for example Mao decided to nuke someone, no one could have ever stopped him as he was an absolute power.
The article is in SCMP too. Since I didn't get to see UK papers, I assumed it was an article from another newspaper, SCMP very seldom has anything original. It is interesting how the news paper always selects "important" stuff (1961!)for their headlines.
You gotta give the Brits credit. Thatcher even tried to "renegotiate" the 99 year lease that was signed under gunpoint.
Compare this with the article from The Bulletin (link in name below) last year that described how China's nukes have been on ice (unfueled, no warhead) from the get go:
"In a strange way, Beijing placed more faith in Washington and Moscow than in its own military officers."
Darin, the 3 times nuclear weapons have been used in wars (actual nukes in Japan, and depleted uranium munitions in Iarq and the Balkans) are all from the same supposed non-authoritarian country.
I thought that this link is available to all leading newspapers and why the Uk press are over this story. When nuclear weapons has been used in Japan then nobody said anything why there was a quietness!
why to go nuclear guys? CAn't we sort things with peace and quietness. When everybody knew about it then why UK press is after this. Do they think that something is there that shouldnot be published?
China's foremost sports commentator, Huang Jianxiang, is in trouble after getting a little carried away with Italy's last gasp, controversial win over Australia in the World Cup. What did he say?
"Grosso done it! He done it! Great Italian left back! Grosso alone represents the long history and tradition of Italian soccer! He is not fighting alone at the moment!" he continued. "Totti! He is about to take the shot! He shoulders the expectations of the whole world! It's a goal! Game over! Italy didn't fall to Hiddink's team this time! (Hiddink led South Korea to knock out Italy in the 2002 World Cup). Happy birthday to Paolo Maldini (born on July 26)! Long Live Italy!"
Huang then turned to the Socceroos and yelled,"Go home! Go home! But they don't need to fly back to Australia. It's too far away. Most of them live in Europe anyway. Bye-bye!"
Huang was not repentant for his controversial comments in the satellite linkup with the Beijing live program after match. "I am a human being, not a machine, and I can't be impartial all the time," he explained while being interviewed. "Australia reminded me of a lousy team which eliminated China in the 1981 World Cup qualifiers. Australia is just like New Zealand team that beat us in 1981," he explained. "It (Australia) is full of neutralized Australians who play and live in Britain. I don't care about the Australian team and don't want to see Australia have good results."
"Australia (which has joined the Asian Football Confederation) will fight for an Asian World Cup berth and it may not be good enough to contend with South Korea and Japan. But it will very likely take advantage of the Chinese team. So I don't like it."
Neutralized Australians? With Prime Minister John Howard currently shopping in Shenzhen, that doesn't bode well for my compatriots. Huang has now apologized. If he is so passionate about Italy, one shudders to think what he would be like if China had actually made the finals.
Meanwhile, in the interests of bringing you the finest from the China Daily, a NSFW gallery of nude photography in Hunan. Good to see the clampdown on "indecent" websites is paying off.
"one shudders to think what he would be like if China had actually made the finals."
he would say,
"Go home! Go home! But they don't need to fly back to China. It's too far away. Most of them live in Europe anyway. Bye-bye!"
---
the translation missed the 'a list of names whose spirits of old great (passed away?) has attached to Grosso's body at the moment', when he made the 'not alone' comment.
well, when i first viewed the clip on youtube, i honestly thought he was being sarcastic on the PK verdict.
"one shudders to think what he would be like if China had actually made the finals."
he would say,
"Go home! Go home! But they don't need to fly back to China. It's too far away. Most of them live in Europe anyway. Bye-bye!"
---
the translation missed the 'list of names whose spirits of the ghosts of old great (passed away?) italian players have attached to Grosso's body at the moment', when he made the 'not alone' comment.
so, when i first viewed the clip on youtube, i honestly thought he was being sarcastic on the PK verdict.
I was interested by his use of the phrase 'neutralized Australians' - I don't know but I wonder if that was supposed to mean 'naturalised Australians' - and if so that might indicate that part of the reason he doesn't like the Australian team is because he imagines that Croatians, Italians etc aren't "real" Australians, and that the Australian team isn't 100% Australian. Which I think shows a fundamental ignorance of what Australians are really like.
p.s. that ties with his last quote that 'most of them live in europe anyway'
however, technically, if you are naturalized you will only be able to represent your new motherland. (australia allows double nationality?)
but i dont think huang is famous for careful choice of words.
But that just shows the commentator's ignorance - all of those players were born in Australia. They live in Europe because they play in European leagues - like Sun Ji Hai.
Unexpected victories are on the way these days..........Brazil's lost against France was toooooooo shocking. France attitude seemed as if they wanted to pay off the old scores(revenge) and they succeeded too. Now wat?????
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Thanks!
1. Curzon from CA has posted an incredible travelogue of his journey from Vietnam, through China and onto Japan. It's an excellent combination of photos, commentary, history, thoughts and even sounds. It also demonstrates the difference between travelling and a journey.
Thanks Simon, for alerting me to Curzon's travelogue.
I enjoyed reading his travelogue, and I loved his photos – just beautiful. I have lots of China travel photos on my site too, though my site isn't as beautifully presented.
Curzon's travelogue, as Jing commented, is a little light and “crispy”, but it is his overall assessments of China that arouses my interested the most, for they are both provocative and insightful. Curzon writes: “Regarding political freedoms, I think Robert D. Kaplan is right when he says that [today’s] Chinese Communist Party has done more to raise living standards than any other ruling elite in any society in the modern world. Had a dysfunctional democracy arisen out of Tiananmen Square in 1989, China would not be as rich as it is today. Human rights must be viewed in context, and the right to an education, to eat, to work, and to raise a family are far more important than the right to vote.”
I couldn’t agree more with this, though in the past I have often been dismissed as a “CCP apologist” for expressing this exact same opinion. It’s refreshing to find others who have similar assessments. The British journalist, Kieth Sinclair, shares in this view too, but he is among the few that I have come across.
I’m sceptical of Curzon's assertion though, that the Vietnamese poor are “poorer” than their Chinese counterparts. How has he measured and compared the two, I wonder? I have travelled throughout Vietnam too, and although extremes in wealth are certainly not as sharp in Vietnam as they are here in China, the poverty I saw there was no “better” than what I have come across here in China.
Thanx for the tons of pics! Seems you enjoyed a lot. Visiting these unknown places would be much easier now, since everythings are so detailed and informative. No more crap about travelling, food and accomodation.
China correspondent Tim Johnson has started a new blog of his impressions of Chinese news, culture, politics and the oddities of adjusting to life in the Middle Kingdom. Check it out: http://washingtonbureau.typepad.com/china/
China is busy considering an anti-monopoly law as another mark in its evolution towards a market economy. One can overlook the irony of a nominally Communist country introducing such a law. One can marvel at the differences between China's opening economy and its closed political monopoly. The article says:
"The aim of the law is to protect fair competition, prevent and check monopolistic behavior and maintain an orderly market place," Xinhua News Agency said of the draft law Saturday.
The draft law bans monopolistic agreements such as price-fixing and other forms of collusion, while providing guidelines on investigating and prosecuting monopolistic practices.
Meanwhile, supposed laissez-faire and free-wheeling Hong Kong has no such law despite cartels in everything from petrol retailing to supermarkets to property.
Unfortunately there are many who think Hong Kong has no place for any anti-monopoly legislation precisely because HK is supposed to be laissez-faire.
The editorial in the lastest issue of Next Mag cites a research claiming that the profit margins of local supermarket chains are 'only' 6%; it goes on to say that if the chains really are a monopoly or an oligopoly, the margins wouldn't be so low. Therefore, it says, monopolies don't really exist in HK and so the anti-monopoly legislation's proposal is only for gaining political points, blah blah blah.
I would recommend the editor of Next Magazine to read "Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong", which may let him look at the issue from a different perspective.
Technically anti-monopoly laws are not laissez faire. Many people confuse Laissez Faire with government mandated competitive markets. Laissez Faire means the government should leave the market alone and let it find its own structure. If cartels, oligopolies or monopolies develop it is because that is the best way for the market to deliver the goods that people want most efficiently. Also, they claim that monopoly profits etc could not persist for long because in a level playing field without barriers to entry someone would come in and compete if the profit margins were high enough.
I am not debating whether government anti-monopoly laws are or are not justified. Just saying they are not consistent with the principal of Laissez Faire. So PRC's use of them does not make the PRC more Laissez Faire than Hong Kong.
I am also not saying that Hong Kong is necessarily as Laissez Faire as is commonly thought. It can be debated that the HK Government creates the barriers to entry that allows to cartels to persist.
Finally, just because the PRC has a law against it doesn't mean much in a country that does not recognize the "rule of law". One owner, the Chinese Communist Party is still the largest owner of business in the PRC. Those they don't own are still not really "free market" in that the government can, and often does, use its regulatory powers to direct private businesses activities. Theoretically, it is "private property" as long as you stay within the bands of use the government wishes. For example, if a private owner of a factory wanted to shut it down and lay off 1000 workers and start a parking garage with 10 workers may find someone from the PRC government "there to help" them change their mind.
"In the left corner, in the red shorts, we have the Rabble-rouser of the Rhineland, the Terror of Trier, KAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAARRRRRRRLLLL MARRRX! And in the right corner, in the green shorts, worn over the black salwar kameez, we have the Defender of the Faith, the Mac Daddy of Mecca, the MUUUUHHH-HHHAMMMAD!"
I thought it a Kapital joke today when I read about how some Muslim extremist fanatics were decrying the World Cup and the 'opium of football', and a 'plot aiming to corrupt Muslim youth and district them from jihad.'
It reminded me of the dour London-based German Karl Marx, who decried religions like Islam 'the opiate of the people'. It seems that the narcotic effect of religion (although fundamentalist Islam seems a bit more of a stimulant) is unequal to the oblivion-inducing result of the beautiful game.
What's wrong with a little opiate now and again, anyway?
Donald Tsang today paid special praise to Hong Kong's traffic network, believing that Hong Kong's competitive advantage comes from its traffic network.
I don't dispute that efficiency is key to Hong Kong's success. But it seems to me that sort of thinking, and the free rein government gives to the traffic and roads planning department, is the reason that all city planning is led by the nose by the road builders. That's why we have the most beautiful harbour in the world yet don't have a harbourfront promenade worth walking down. It's why a small proposed park in Wanchai will only be accessible through an underpass, and the initial plans for a park on the Central waterfront will not be put on top of buildings. That's also why streetside road pollution continues to clog our lungs.
I fear when reading this article that the top leadership of Hong Kong still haven't gotten the message - that the road planners cannot any longer be the key determinants of how our city looks. If anyone can refute my pessimism, please indulge me.
Hong Kong SAR government has a deal with some French or Dutch company to create ''smart'' traffic patterns. They are looking to install electronic devices that monitor traffic and help regulate flow based on limiting traffic patterns. see more with the internet functional constituency legislator.
I think that we should remember that HK has come leaps and bounds in terms of environmental awareness. I grew up in HK in the days before daily API indices that 'informed you when you should avoid those roadside stations' and have to say that things have gotten much better.
The harbor in particular has cleaned up immeasurably, no doubt thanks to lobbying on the part of NGO's. The pessimism isn't unfounded, but the opportunity for progress does exist. When society at large considers it a big enough problem, the gears of change will click. Hope it's sooner rather than later.
I think that one reason we do have daily API indices is because the pollution here has gotten so much worse since when you were growing up!
The harbour is cleaner, but 30% of the effluents being pumped into the harbour every day are still untreated.
Hong Kong has a long ways to go before it can pat itself on the back and say that it is being proactive about pollution. Allowing its traffic department to lead the city's development efforts is most certainly not the way forward.
It is time to draw one conclusion about Donald Tsang: he is a political genius. He's managed to turn West Kowloon into a non-issue. He managed to propose partial democratic reforms that he knew the democrat camp had to oppose, making them the blockage to further changes and securing the status quo for the next election cycle. He's been lucky enough to preside at a time where there are no killer diseases or stock market crashes (yet). He's won the praise of his masters in Beijing and even managed to silence the local pro-Beijing crowd, who accept him because they have to, no because they want to. Legco will approve his boondoggle: the new Tamar government HQ. The flimsy justifications continue, as Hemlock reports today:
is an article by construction workers’ union boss Choi Chun-wa in the South China Morning Post arguing that the Tamar project is essential as it will create 2,500 jobs for his gruff, sweaty, grimy, horny handed, malodorous members.
According to my trusty Casio magic solar-powered calculator, that adds up to a mere HK$2,040,000 per job. For that, we could give 5,000 unskilled, underemployed members of our workforce who can’t afford to live here a million dollars each plus a one-way ticket back to their mainland pig farms, thus relieving our heartbreaking underclass-in-poverty problem and improving the dreadful, Third World gini coefficient at a stroke. When the gap between rich and poor is measured in hundreds of miles, everyone will be happy.
When The Don tucks his legs under his new desk from his top floor corner office in this $5 billion building, he'll be entitled to smile and reflect on his success as a politician.
George Friedman at StratFor is not a believer in the Chinese economic boom. He looks at the problems China faces in its transition to a market economy, models for dealing with these problems and the domestic and international political implications. You may not agree with his analysis but it's thought-provoking reading.
China: Crisis and Implications
By George Friedman
The Chinese government is continuing efforts to cope with its runaway economy. The People's Bank of China has raised interest rates. Banks have been told to curb lending. The government has said that it will implement procedures to rein in foreign acquisitions at low prices -- or, in other words, to block fire-sales of Chinese companies. As a recent headline in the Japan Times put it, "China's Monetary Surge Dooms Its Boom."
A lot of things have gone into dooming China's boom, and the money surge is one of the more immediate problems. However, as we have argued (and this article should be read in the context of past analyses), the end of the Chinese boom was inevitable. The issue now is how all of this will play out in China and in the world.
What must be understood is that China now is moving from an economic problem to a socio-political one. The financial problem is a symptom; the fundamental problem is that tremendous irrationality has been built into the Chinese economy. Enterprises that are not economically viable continue to function through infusions of cash. Some of the cash comes from borrowing, some by exporting at economically unsustainable prices. The result is a squandering of resources. The reasons that this continues have nothing to do with economic rationalism and everything to do with political and social reality.
If interest rates were to rise and lending were to become disciplined, many of China's enterprises would fail. This would bring several consequences.
The rest is continued below the jump.
First, and most important, it would result in a massive increase in unemployment. At this point, the irrationality has been going on for years. It is not only state-owned enterprises that are economically unsustainable; many newer enterprises, including those in which Western companies have invested, are not succeeding. When we look at the figures for nonperforming and troubled loans, they amount to nearly half of China's gross domestic product. That represents a lot of irrationality, a lot of financial failures and a lot of unemployment. And unemployment is a political and social problem. The question is whether China politically can afford the economic solution.
Second, lending has become a system for maintaining the political solidarity of China's elite. Loans have been made not only to avoid the problem of unemployment; they also were made as part of political arrangements that allowed the Chinese Communist Party and regional party organizations to avoid conflict and divisions. As long as the pie was growing, everyone could have a piece. But if the pie starts contracting, there will be losers and winners. The question of who will go bankrupt and who will not will become a highly divisive and potentially destabilizing political crisis. Again, the economic solution -- austerity -- and political reality may run counter to each other.
Obviously, China has massive cash reserves. These may not be massive enough to cover the financial crisis, but they are sufficient to allow the government to put off addressing the problem for a while. China also has the ability to promulgate rules and regulations that allow bankrupt entities to continue functioning. However, it always must be remembered that on the other side of a bad loan is a damaged creditor. A loan that can be deferred by fiat is an asset that can no longer be used. When you avoid economic disaster for the debtor, you transfer the pain -- and potentially the disaster -- to the creditor. And since the creditor is normally the economically healthier entity, you postpone the death of the weak by weakening the strong. The more you do this, the worse it becomes. Thus, whether the Chinese use cash reserves to postpone the problem or use regulation to do so, the net result will be buying time at the cost of increased pain.
China's Likely Path
Asia has been here before. Japan encountered this problem around 1990, and East and Southeast Asia encountered it in 1997. Roughly three models for dealing with the problem exist:
* Japan model: Use reserves and formal and informal measures to avoid actions that would trigger massive bankruptcies and unemployment. Accept economic stagnation for the better part of a generation.
* South Korea model: Move rapidly to restructure the economy, using economic and political means. Control social unrest with security measures. Move out of the problem in a matter of years.
* Indonesia model: Lacking resources to manage the crisis, suffer both financial dysfunction and political strife among the elite and between regions.
Japan was able to do what it did because it is a highly disciplined, cohesive society, in which shared pain is viewed as preferable to social dislocation. South Korea was able to do what it did because the magnitude of its crisis was relatively less than Japan's, and because the state had the means for suppressing unhappiness. Indonesia failed to do what it needed to do because it lacked resources and political power.
Other countries have fallen somewhere along this continuum. China will make its own path. However, it should be pointed out that China is not socially similar to either Japan or South Korea. Like Indonesia, China is a diverse and divided nation. The Communist Party lost its moral standing in the 1970s. As with Suharto's government, its legitimacy now derives from the fact that it has created prosperity. When prosperity slows down or stops, the Party cannot fall back on inherent legitimacy, as was the case with the system in Japan. And the wildly diverse levels of economic development make a single, integrated solution, as was used in South Korea, unlikely. The most likely direction for China, therefore, is massive social and political instability.
Now, the Communist Party may lack moral authority, but it does wield tremendous power. The People's Liberation Army and the various security forces are an enormous presence in China. Indeed, the government already is using its security forces aggressively, cracking down on dissent and against at least some business leaders, in anticipation of coming troubles. The ability to suppress unrest is not trivial. Therefore, the most likely path for China in a post-boom environment is to increase suppression and reimpose systematic dictatorship.
This is not an absolute given. There are many in the Party who now are arguing that China has abandoned its Communist principles and its social base. In other words, they want to reach out to the peasants in the interior, who have benefited little from the boom and who resent the prosperity of the coastal regions. The idea is to use these peasants in a process of renationalization -- or, at least, a process in which the free market is dramatically limited and at least some of the wealth is redistributed.
This goal makes little economic sense, but what China needs economically is unsupportable socially and politically. Imposing a crushing austerity for five to ten years would solve the economic problem, but it is unlikely that the political center could hold. Indeed, if the Chinese were to follow this course, they could do it only with massive political suppression at the same time.
The Party's Tangled Web
Therefore, one likely path is the reimposition of dictatorship, followed by whatever economic solutions the leadership might want to make. But there is a problem here: The interests of Party and People's Liberation Army leaders in Shanghai diverge from those of the central government. These leaders are deeply involved in the financial process of the coastal area, in bringing in foreign investment, in taking advantage of the nonmarket access to capital. They have no inclination to stop. Indeed, their wish is to see the irrational boom continue as long as possible.
There are splits in the interests of regional Party leaders, as well as a split between the regions and Beijing. The interests of coastal leaders lie not with Beijing so much as with Tokyo, New York and London. They have integrated themselves in the international financial system, and they are busy making plans for sustaining their regional enterprises in the event of a crisis. Meanwhile, Party leaders from the interior are demanding that these actions be stopped and that investment flow to their regions instead. Beijing is riding two horses that are running in very different directions.
Beijing well might fall off the horses. China has a history of cycling between a dictatorial system that closes it off from the world (a poor, but equal and stable China) and a system in which China is open to the world but torn apart from the inside out. Consider: Mao marched into the interior, raised a peasant army, came back and liquidated the internationalist bourgeoisie in 1948. He closed off the country and united it, throwing out the foreigners. Under the other model, preceding Mao, the country was open to foreigners, who tore it apart in regional conflicts while the interior starved.
The end result of China's economic crisis, therefore, will be a deep-seated political crisis. Only ever-increasing amounts of money have allowed China to maintain the current political alignment. Without that, it has two options. The first is a return to some sort of dictatorship from Beijing, under which economic problems would be dealt with inefficiently but unambiguously. The other is to accept a split between the coastal regions and the interior, the weakening of Beijing's authority and a period of instability and intense regionalism. It all depends on the political moves Beijing is making now, but our bet would be on the latter course. The instruments of power that Beijing has are too complicit in the financial crisis, and have too many diverging interests, to make the first option likely.
Geopolitics and Ripple Effects
Two possible geopolitical models emerge from this. Under one -- in its extreme form -- China returns to some sort of geopolitical Maoism. It encloses itself from the world, becomes increasingly bellicose but is limited by its own geography in what it can do. Under the other model, China slowly fragments and becomes a cockpit for the ambitions of foreign economic interests -- backed up by political and military power, with regional Chinese officials collaborating with foreigners to continue economic development. Oddly, the latter model would be more destabilizing to the world than the former, inasmuch as everyone will want to maintain their investments in China and expand them. In this scenario, China would again be a magnet for problems.
Mind you, these are not absolutes, but represent extremes on a continuum. There is surely a model under which Beijing would muddle through, as have the Japanese or Indonesians. No coherent strategy would emerge; it would all be tactical. It is difficult for us to see how this would not lead to regional destabilization, but then, China might be able to live with that. How it handles the unemployment and displaced peasant issue, however, is yet another question. This is a possible mid-point on the spectrum, but not in itself likely, it would seem.
As for the effects on the international economy, there has been a great deal of discussion about China's ownership of U.S. Treasury instruments and the consequences if that money were withdrawn in a crisis. In fact, this is the last thing that is going to happen. If China has a massive financial crisis, no one -- including the Chinese government -- is going to shift money from a safe haven into an uncertain cauldron. In crisis, the tendency would be a flight to safety. That means that rather than being pulled out, money would surge into the U.S. market -- legally and illegally, from the Chinese standpoint.
It is interesting to correlate the massive U.S. market surges that began in 1991, after the recession, and intensified dramatically in 1997 and 1998, with trends in Asia. In both cases, these surges followed major economic crises in rapidly expanding Asian economies. The events were, in our opinion, linked. The crisis in Japan in 1990 and 1991 led to major capital flight and helped to fuel the U.S. market rise. Similarly, the impending and expected East Asian meltdown in 1997 produced massive capital flight from Taiwan, South Korea and elsewhere to safer havens. A massive withdrawal from the U.S. market is the last thing to be expected.
What are in danger, of course, are foreign investments in China. There is the obvious financial issue: Many of these investments were not economically viable to begin with. But there is a political problem as well. The Party is going to have to blame someone for China's troubles, and it will not be the leadership. The obvious culprits will be corrupt officials and their paymasters in the international banking system. The truth or falsehood of the charge will matter little; corrupt officials and bankers already are being arrested, in the early stages of the crisis. As the situation intensifies, we would not be surprised to see foreigners investigated for corrupt practices as well.
But the bottom line is this: China has a history of nationalization and expropriation, and the party that enacted those measures is still in power. No one would have believed that the Party of Mao possibly could have become what it is today, but one should not assume that the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party is complete. Leaders could find that they have reason to re-enact some of Mao's own economic policies. We would be surprised to see a complete return to Maoism. We would not, however, be surprised to see the Party deliberately reverse some transactions that are no longer in its interests or (as and if things get more intense) take even more radical steps. It is still a Communist Party, it might be useful to recall.
Ultimately, the choice that China is now making is how quickly it will allow the consequences of its economic irrationality to unfold. The economic answer to the problem is to let shaky enterprises fall -- but the political cost of doing so will be too great, and a solution has already been long delayed. The longer an economic solution is delayed, the less one becomes possible and the more intense becomes Beijing's need to address the problem with political and security solutions. The more dependent the Chinese become on such measures, the more catastrophic will be the consequences if these solutions don't work.
China is long past the point of being able to solve the problem easily. The question is simply whether to buy time and pay in intensity, or force the crisis now. At some point, there no longer will be a choice. But the single most important thing to understand is that China does not really have an economic crisis any longer. The time for that has come and gone. There is now a political crisis at hand.
Almost everyone involved with China can agree it is not the economic or political monolith usually portrayed in the Western media.
But this analyses is based on so many assumptions that may or may not be correct and on so many predictions that may or may not come true that it is really nothing more than one persons's finger in the wind prediction of China's future.
Is there any evidence that these sorts of predictions are any more reliable than an 8 ball?
George Friedman's prognosticative abilities are so poor, he can't hit the figurative broad side of a barn from two feet away.
This was the man who fortold the that the U.S and Japan would have gone to war, in fact he wrote a whole book about it. He also wrote in an earlier article that China was facing the dreaded crisis of ethnic Manchurian separatism.
Jing, I didn't say I agreed with him. I just said this kind of thing is thought-provoking, and it should be noted that plenty of influential people do agree with him.
Who even knew Readers' Digest still existed in this day and age? The good people from RD conducted a global politness survey, based on several tests conducted in various cities. The survey was massively biased against Hong Kong because it included a test to see if people would hold doors open for others. In Hong Kong an open door is good for only two things: barging through or closing quickly. Putting its legitimacy in question, the survey found New York the most polite city in the world. Hong Kong was equal 25th along with Bangkok and some place in Europe with not enough vowels, just tipping out touchy Taipei, those rude bastards in Singapore, surly Seoul, cranky Kuala Lumpur and melancholy Mumbai. The survey seems to exhibit cultural bias, with the top cities being primarily Western and the bottom Asian. Or perhaps Asia is just home to a lot of rude pr!cks. Any visitor to New York will quickly realise Asia does not have a monopoly on rudeness.
The list is below the jump. No need to thank me.
The politeness survey:
1 New York, USA 80 per cent
2 Zurich, Switzerland 77 per cent
3 Toronto, Canada 70 per cent
4 Berlin, Germany 68 per cent
San Paulo, Brazil 68 per cent
Zagreb, Croatia 68 per cent
7 Auckland, New Zealand 67 per cent
Warsaw, Poland 67 per cent
9 Mexico City, Mexico 65 per cent
10 Stockholm, Sweden 63 per cent
11 Budapest, Hungary 60 per cent
Madrid, Spain 60 per cent
Prague, Czech Republic 60 per cent
Vienna, Austria 60 per cent
15 Buenos Aires, Argentina 57 per cent
Johannesburg, SA 57 per cent
Lisbon, Portugal 57 per cent
London, UK 57 per cent
Paris, France 57 per cent
....
20 Amsterdam, Netherlands 52 per cent
21 Helsinki, Finland 48 per cent
Manila, Philippines 48 per cent
23 Milan, Italy 47 per cent
Sydney, Australia 47 per cent
25 Bangkok, Thailand 45 per cent
Hong Kong 45 per cent
Ljubljana, Slovenia 45 per cent
28 Jakarta, Indonesia 43 per cent
29 Taipei, Taiwan 43 per cent
30 Moscow, Russia 42 per cent
Singapore 42 per cent
32 Seoul, South Korea 40 per cent
33 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 37 per cent
34 Bucharest, Romania 35 per cent
35 Mumbai, India 32 per cent
I've been to New York many times and have always been impressed with how friendly everyone is. I think the rude image developed in the 60s and 70s when crime grew like crazy. It dropped a lot in the 90s, and some of the more annoying stuff - like people trying to extor money from you by washing your car windshield - has disappeared.
Being a New Yorker, I find your comment just as biased as you find the study to be. Having lived in Asia, I understand that every place has different rules, but lines are not something prized in most places I have been. I have watched old women get pushed out of the way to get on a bus. In my eyes this is rude because of the way I grew up and how we define polite v. rude. This survey is something where I believe relativity is okay.
I too have lived in Hong Kong and other Asian cities for several decades now. And I am a New Yorker, born and raised. I can tell you, without a doubt, that Hong is one of, if the rudest places I have even been. If your pomy butt has a problem with that, too bad. And that isn't NYC rudeness in my words. Just the way it is. As for culture, sure, no doubt about that either, RD is a western publication, so why are you surprised for a western slant on what is rude and what is not? Have you ever had translated for you (or can you read Chinese, too, like you speak Cantonese?) some of the crap that is printed in Asia about western culture and lifestyles? It's enough to make you want to . . .
I was puzzled by this as well. But the survey is by no means scientific and it certainly biased.
It bases part of the result on whether shop assistants say 'thank you.' In Asia they more often than not don't, but in tip- and commission-driven New York you better believe that they will.
I wouldn't have given it a second thought if it were to suggest that Asian cities generally have really crappy customer service compared to Western states.
Perhaps a broader study could include some distinctly Asian concepts of what qualifies as polite behavior.
For instance: "Does your drinking partner quickly refill your soju/baiju/sake/spirit glass when it is emptied?" If that was tested, I doubt Western nations would top the list.
Reader’s Digest Culturally Challenged or Just Plain Rude?
While scanning the news, I was rather shocked to come across a headline stating that Reader’s Digest had ranked Taipei near the bottom of the list in a survey of the 35 most courteous cities around the world. These findings were in stark contrast with my own experiences. I have visited Taipei on several occasions and have always found the Taiwanese to be extremely hospitable and friendly.
The people in Taipei went out their way to show courtesy and even concern for my wellbeing. Let me impart just three examples of the numerous acts of civility I was either personally shown or witnessed as a guest of their country.
Upon arrival, while waiting to clear customs, I noticed a woman at the front of the line holding a small infant and a couple of carry-on bags. Needless to say, she was having a difficult time managing all of this and filling out the declaration form. One of the Taiwanese airport personnel immediately rushed over to hold the child while the lady completed the document. The look of relief on the woman’s face was palpable. As neither apparently spoke the other’s language, smiles were exchanged in recognition of gratitude and understanding.
On one occasion as I was fumbling with a token machine trying to purchase a train ticket, a group of four girls noticed the trouble I was having and very shyly asked if they could assist. Not only did the girls take the time in a busy train station to show a visitor how to buy a ticket, they were kind enough to show me to the correct waiting platform.
On another occasion I had stopped at a small street-side restaurant to have lunch and ordered a Diet Coke with the meal. The waiter apologetically explained they did not serve soft drinks and asked if would I care for something else. I told him it was no problem and ordered tea. When my food arrived, a Diet Coke accompanied it. When I questioned the waiter he said he had asked the owner if it would be okay to walk across the street and buy one for me. By the way, it is not customary to tip waiters in Taiwan.
These were not isolated events, it was a reoccurring theme and one I considered a lesson in manners for myself. So it seemed to me that there must be one of two things happening here; either I have been one of the most fortunate travelers to Taiwan or there was something seriously wrong with the survey. Pulling up the original article published by Reader’s Digest I quickly learned that it was DEFINITELY the survey that was flawed.
The courtesy rankings were based off of three criteria. One, would a person hold a door for a stranger. Two, would a passerby help pickup dropped documents. Three, do the salesclerks say thank you after a customer completes a purchase. So, what is wrong with this you ask? Nothing, if you happen to be from the United States or another country that has these customs. Common courtesies are not always common practices.
Different nations have different ways of showing politeness and we should not pick three random scenarios from our own society to judge. Take for example picking up the dropped documents. One 19-year old female from Taiwan explained that the reason she had not helped the “MAN” pickup the papers was to keep him from losing face. In essence she was being polite by her society’s standards in ignoring a potentially embarrassing situation for the man. Her country was subsequently downgraded for her act of politeness and points deducted from the overall politeness score.
What would happen if we were subjected to a similar test by Taiwanese standards? Stuck the chopsticks in the rice, minus one point from the US score (represents death). Gave a clock or timepiece as a birthday gift, minus one more point (death again). Giving a married guy a green colored hat as a present, minus a bunch points (suggests his wife is cheating on him). These may fall more into the social faux pas realm but you get the point.
So to the writers at Reader’s Digest may I suggest that ranking another country based off of one’s own customs, courtesies and social norms is not just inaccurate, it is
quite frankly…rude.
Skin colour would effect the outcome. Ask for directions in HK in Cantonese wearing a white skin and you will be told "Noh m sic yingmun" (I don't understand English) and get a hand waved in your face. Quite rude! Doubt you would get that response if you were wearing your yellow skin.
Conventional wisdom says China's intellectual property rights (IPR) are close to non-existant. Piracy is rampant and the exception that proves the rule is the tight control over China's Olympic merchandise. That said, even the same association can't quite work out how much it's costing. Two articles from today's Standard. First:
Piracy cost filmmakers US$2.7 billion (HK$21.06 billion) last year, with domestic firms shouldering more than half those losses, according to a study commissioned by a trade group representing the major Hollywood studios. China's film industry lost US$1.5 billion in revenue to piracy, while US studios lost US$565 million, according to data released Monday by the Motion Picture Association...Some 93 percent of all movie sales in China were of pirated versions of films, according to the latest study.
Makes you wonder about the 7% that buy originals at 5 times the price of copies. The key is to note that China's film industry suffers far more than America's. But from an op-ed in the same paper:
California Democratic congresswoman Diane Watson, whose district includes parts of Hollywood, said roughly 95 percent of all CDs and DVDs manufactured in China are counterfeit. She quoted the Motion Picture Association of America, claiming that its member companies lost about US$244 million in revenue to Chinese piracy last year.
Same association, two vastly different numbers. Maybe the MPAA uses Chinese statisticians to put the numbers together?
Who's to blame here? Is it the average Chinese worker, who earns maybe 5,000 yuan a year and can either buy a copy for 5 yuan or the original for 10 times as much? Is it China's government, who's domestic industry and creativity suffers far more from piracy than Hollywood? Or is it the outdated business and pricing models of foreign companies in the Chinese market?
Update 21/6
AP points to an excellent piece on the Variety blog that also shows the MPAA numbers are fantasy and rubbery (but what else can you expect from Hollywood?), as well as making some other telling points about these "losses".
You forgot the twin storm of Hollywood trying to delay DVD releases until well after the film is in cinemas with the fact that China imposes strict quotas (and other censorship) on foreign films (which includes Hong Kong films not made on the mainland as a JV with a quota of mainland actors and crew) making it in to cinemas at all.
So it's not just a strict economic factor of pirate versions being cheaper, but also the temporal factor that pirate versions are often available looooong before Hollywood acts to fill the demand.
China's history in one word is that they are mere "Imitators".
.............piracy is a crime though under whatever circumstances it's been done. There's a n urgent need for some strict laws under which anyone pirating must be charged.
Agree with Billy. I just think Beijing has decided that piracy is overall a net benefit to the Chinese economy and balance of trade despite stunting the film and software industries in China. Yes local officials don't always follow BJ's orders, but they do when they know what BJs priorities are.
As far as 'outdated pricing models': Of course its expensive to buy a dvd for someone not earning much, but American and other countries have this nifty little concept called video rental. Its the same with software, people complain that Photoshop is too expensive. Yes, its too expensive. Its a goddam professional program
The temporal factor (but not the censorship issue)is a by-product of the larger pirating issue IMO. Lax enforcement has allowed pirating which has given rise to large and truly efficient pirating networks. The urgency for the latest dvd NOW has not been the main impetus for piracy. The dvd's of the very very latest movies are also crap (filmed in the theater), so people wait until the movie company issues the dvd version so they buy the pirated version of that.
I will say however, that I am finding more hawkers of pirated dvd operating out of suitcases. I wonder if the city has been cracking down on storefront purveyors. Anyhow, if its a crackdown, I'd be surprised if it lasts long.
Some things to add to my verbal diarrhea:
Obviously video rental won't work here without enforcement of piracy, but I said it to show that the real thing can be affordable to most of the population. For the truly poor here, there already are video rental places...renting pirated dvd's that is.
Enforcement:
--The number of police in Shenzhen are restricted by the Official size of the city, which is different than reality. In Shenzhen you will see a lot of people in a uniform and on bicycle who are not police and have basically no power.
--a tremendously small percentage of police actually are on patrol etc. A huge number are basically bureaucrats pushing the many forms around that we all fill out--which is why you see so many policewoman wearing pumps amd policemen wearing loafers.
--Recently those few police in Shenzhen on patrol have been cruising around at slow speeds with their lights flashing. As if "hey pirateers! hide your stuff for a few minutes while we drive by so we don't have to get out of the car and actually do something."
I'm noticing lots of bashing of pirates here, so I will be devil's avacado for a moment.
Piracy of entertainment content is welcome in China due to the strict regulation and censorship that is placed upon all forms of visual entertainment.
I would wager good money that the majority of China's AmCham and EU Chamber of Commerce members buy pirated DVDs or rob broadcast signals trough illegal sattelite dishes. I imagine that this is also the case for party officials, journalists and employees of MPAA-member companies. It would challenge a person's sanity to only have access to CCP-approved material for viewing.
The majority of pubs where expats are meeting to watch football are not using 'legal' sattelite feeds of pay-per-view matches... they have hacked decoders and illegal dishes.
And the "loss of sales" numbers are complete crap. I picked up a pirated copy of "Bloodrayne" last week for five yuan. It was dreadful and I would never have spent $20 on a legitimate copy, nor would I have wasted 3 bucks on a rental at Blockbuster. Would the MPAA still count that as a full $20 in lost sales? I doubt it.
Until China has a free media, I welcome rampant piracy. (Knock offs of jet-engine parts, medicines and food products is anoter matter)
"It was dreadful and I would never have spent $20 on a legitimate copy, nor would I have wasted 3 bucks on a rental at Blockbuster. Would the MPAA still count that as a full $20 in lost sales? I doubt it." ---
While the stuff you quote is no doubt current, the stuff you've added is way out of date ...
legitimate DVDs of Hollywood films are now available for as low as 15 RMB and the price for most western studios' products has topped out at 30.
A certain major Hollywood studio is now testing selling their DVDs to pirate shops, providing incentives such as promotional materials and displays and generous return policies.
And now, a piece of old news ... "Beijing" has not decided that piracy is beneficial to the economy. However, a number of party officials and army officials at all levels have financial interests in the illegal replication plants and shops and it is their personal interest to see piracy continue as is.
And ... news flash ... the Chinese worker who earns 5,000 RMB per year usually cannot afford to buy a DVD player or a TV. The average urban worker, who earns in a range of 30,000 to 50,000 RMB per year, can afford a TV, a DVD player, and a legitimate 15 RMB DVD.
Variety's Asian cinema blog, Kaiju Shakedown, offers a post today that makes the same point that I attempted to (although much more concisely),:
"But, as we all know, these numbers regarding China are completely bogus anyways. Because most MPAA member movies can't be sold in China so they have no loss. China only allows 20 foreign films to be imported each year, and usually 14 - 16 of these are from MPAA members. So what the MPA is talking about in this report isn't "profits lost to pirates in China" but "profits lost to closed markets in China".
Chris, China only allows 20 foreign films to be screened in cinemas each year. There is no limit on the number of foreign films that can be released on home video. Of course, Chinese censorship does play a roll, so that innocuous fluff like Corpse Bride is banned - but widely available from pirates. Anything that is deemed to be too violent, that shows China in a bad light, that deals with the occult, too sexual, that shows criminals getting away with their crimes is usually banned.
Oh my ghosh !So huuuuuuuuuuge losses, bear it now. Everybody has to pay for the bad deeds, now there's no use of crying on split milk.
..........if China and America still dont realise, atleast i can imagine their dark future with economy falling at a rapid speed.............so...........
2000 people a day may see your site - a pathetic number given the effort you put into promoting it - but I see an awful lot of litter bins, chewing gum on pavements, dog crap and obnoxious tourists. Does that mean they are good too? Discuss.
Stop trying so hard and stop cutting and pasting so much. And the centre column idea is manic.
He's an embittered creaky pom who hosts what may have been HK's first blog, though his glory daze, if he ever had any, are long since forgotten except by him.
Actually George is right about one thing. I can't say I'm overly fond of the center column layout. I feel the links in the side columns eat up too much screen real-estate and it leaves too little space left for reading text.
Actually, if you ever saw George's site, you'd quickly realize that he's the last person on the planet to be giving advice about layout (or chiding anyone about cutting and pasting). Imagine Punch circa 1964 as viewed through a haze of cheap gin and baboon tranquilizers and you're in the general vicinity.
I enjoy the site quite a bit. Nothing is wrong with cutting and pasting links to good stuff. In fact, I especially enjoy the daily linklets when you have the time and inclination to do them! So, thanks. And I'm going to c~~~~ on your ads too.
A recent conversation with an American over the vexed topic of immigration:
Yank: "The problem with the Mexicans is they don't integrate. They don't learn the language or the culture and just keep to themselves and then wonder why people resent them."
"Me: "How long have you lived in Hong Kong?"
Yank: "Four years. Why?"
Me: "How much Cantonese can you speak?""
Well said. I admire your sense of homor. However, is your friend is trying to become a citizen of Hong Kong? Well, being an Asian, I am veyr proud of Asia but I have to admit that you can become a citizen of western countries easier than Asian or African countries.
Actaully, lots of studies have shown that Hispanics learn English at about the same rate as other immigrants. In the second generation everyone speaks English, and by the thrid only a minority still know Spanish. No matter how good their English gets however, their skin is still brown.
With only 20% of Americans having passports, the chances that Americans have been in a day-to-day situation where they are a language minority is pretty slim.
And for the ultimate irony, it may be interesting to see the results of the same questions being asked of the mainland's Hong Kong Liaison Office cadres.
The debate in America is not about immigration. It is about people who have come into the country illegally. How do you think other countries deal with such a situation? How does your beloved Hong Kong SAR China deal with law breakers from other countries? Offer them citizenship? Give them a tax break? You are so far off on your mighty high horse to come down on America like this. As for learning the language, how much Cantonese do you speak? And are you trying to become a citizen of Hong Kong SAR China? Are you legally or illegally in Hong Kong working? What do you think the Hong Kong (Beijing--50 years of autonomy my ass!) government would do to you if were working in Hong Kong illegally? Are you so into yourself that you can't even see the comparisons here?
I believe Mexicans do learn the language and assimilate. However, the English language IS an official language of Hong Kong.
I also disagree with that guy in that I don't think people resent the Mexicans, BUT waving Mexican flags at a rally for immigration and naturalization could start getting people on the road to resentment. No?
Some groups are wary of the political force that they have the potential to be, but that is common in situations of change.
I think you're confusing the issues at hand. Westerners in Asian countries are given the name expatriates mainly because they are not expected to remain in the country permanently. This is definitely not the case with Mexicans who plan on living in the USA for the rest of their lives.
Cantonese is also a very difficult language for most native English speakers. While if I was living in Hong Kong I would probably learn the language, I don't see the need for all of these people to pick up Guangdonghua fluently if they are only going to be in HK for a couple of years.
Plus if the whole language issue ever becomes a problem for expats, I do have a solution for you. You should simply abandon that overpriced, poluted, penal colony of a SAR, and set your sails south for SEA. The wonderful nation of Singapore is always looking for foreign talent and I am sure that all qualified expats will be welcomed with open arms down here.
Furthermore when an Australian lectures the Americans concerning the issue of immigration the words, "physician heal thyself!" come to mind. Don't you guys pay off South Pacific islands to house your unwanted migrants? Or is it taboo to discuss Aussie immigration problems on your blog?
Yes I think that is actually the crux of the problem - that gwailos are generally don't come here as immigrants but as temporary expatriates - as they have for all of Hong Kong's history. Nor do locals particularly invite Westerners to become part of their society.
This is a Chinese city, and the concept of truly being a Hong Kong citizen means that you must, as a pre-condition, be Chinese. You will never truly be accepted as a local here otherwise, regardless of how much Cantonese you speak (and I should know, as a western-looking Eurasian). That, I think, is the main difference between Hong Kong and America - if you are an English-speaking Hispanic, you can be as American as anyone else. Not here.
While this can be chalked up to the still-recent experience of being a Colony, there is also a definite racist element to Hong Kong identity that I think is stronger here than even in mainland China. Hong Kong will need to shed this parochial element of its identity if it does want to keep welcoming expats to its shores (as opposed to Shanghai or Singapore).
Having said that, I can definitely say, that Simon is right - if you speak Cantonese here, even if you are a Westerner, people can be incredibly nice to you. People I think are surprised and proud that a gwailo has bothered to learn their incredibly difficult language that has very limited utility outside of this city.
When I first came to Hong Kong, I took lessons in both Cantonese and Mandarin. Surprisingly, the response I got from locals was always "why would you learn another language when you already know English?"
As someone else has pointed out, there's virtually no debate or controversy in the US over legal immigration. The debate is over illegals. I taught at a university in HK for 6 years because the university wanted to hire me and because I was given a legal permit. My children, when they were born in HK, were given temporary visas and were allowed to stay only as long as I continued to work there under a valid contract.
Being an invited guest is different from breaking into someone's home and then complaining over not being given enough food or hospitality! I was grateful to be allowed to visit Hong Kong and would have left if the government had told me to.
To bobby fletcher, your comment, insinuation, that the US stole Mexico is outright BS (that means bullshit, amigo)! The two governments, who both did want the land at the time, came to a financial agreement. And the people who were living on the land in question had a lot to say about which country they would rather align themselves. And if you want to really call the kettle black, can tell me what language Mexicans speak? Spanish? Seems to me that the Spanish stole the land called Mexico from the Native American Indians, just like you might insinuate the Americans and Canadians did, and frankly, every single country in North, Central and South America. Get off you high horse too! I don't think you know enough about history to comment on the subject.
"We didn't cross the border, the border crossed us!" is a ridiculous cop-out because very very few latinos can actually claim descent from anyone involved in the Mexican-American war. (Oh and I know this didn't work for Mrs. Thatcher, but over in the Americas a treaty signed back in the 1800s is still a treaty, regardless of the current political climate...)
Hong Kong has razor wire separating itself from the rest of the country. Do we really want to compare expats passing through Hong Kong to families crossing the border in the US? Has anyone read Steve Vines' recent column in The Hongkong Standard re: right of abode families? And is Hong Kong society really prepared for someone whose parents came from Pakistan or Nepal going to school and being treated as an equal? Can he walk in to a room of Chinese, say "ngoh dou haih heung gong yahn" in perfect Cantonese, and expect to be treated with respect?
Having said all this, I'm not in favor of criminalizing the Mexican illegals--aren't conservatives also fans of letting the market decide, of less government intrusion? Mexicans cross the border to work, not live off of the dole. If you're going to be against government programs, then I think it's a bit hypocritical to all of a sudden want a giant brick wall built along the Rio Grande when all these people are doing is filling jobs, earning money, and trying to get ahead in life--just like the ancestors of most every other American. American really can accomodate these extra people.
PS I speak Cantonese with near-fluency. It's really not THAT hard to learn, and, well, you hear it every single day, so why not give it a shot? You tend to get treated differently...
PPS why is xanga considered "questionable content" when I try to post here?
Fare thee well friends, co-contributor to HK Dave has been caught in temporal limbo. My body clock, despite my valiant attempts to resist it by succumbing to influenza, etc, is now gradually settling into Central European Time thanks to the feast of football available.
Now as my wife is Korean, I have a great deal of sympathy for the Korean team. This was magnified tenfold by the incredible welcome I got from the citizens of Cheju as I was visitor there at the last World Cup. I was therefore on the Seoul Times website looking for interesting stories about the football. And that's when I stumbled upon the picture (faintly NSFW).
The caption for the picture accompanying this article purports to be about spicy Sichuan cuisine offered up at the Seoul Hilton's Taipan restaurant.
I remember when reading James Clavell's Noble House, one character said that in Cantonese 'taipan' means 'brothel-keeper' instead of 'boss'. It seems appropriate - I knw Sichuan food is supposed to be spicy, but this seems to go entirely too far!
I ve just got back from Berlin fan fest......WOW Wat a weekend, England win and i met so many fans from around the world. It was fantastic. Well done Berlin and Germany........ and who the hell had the time to think of food?????
Nostalgia typically doesn't translate well into book form, especially when the author's topic is himself. But Martin Booth's Gweilo is an exception to the rule. The reason? Because Booth has actually written a character study dressed up as a memior. Set against a Hong Kong recovering from Japanese occupation in World War 2, Booth paints a portrait of a woman who was far ahead of her time in her open-mindedness, her intelligence, her forthrightness and her foresight. Who is this woman? His mother. Now while many little boys worship their mother, it would truly seem that in Booth's case she was an exceptional woman.
Booth's book is deceptively easy to read, which shows how well it has been written. A young Booth dives head-first into the Hong Kong milieu and ends up far richer for the experience. His father, on the other hand, was the very caricature of an English expat, in Hong Kong under suffrance and worried about his wife and child "going native". There are still many parallels with today's expats in the two kinds of experiencces.
This book shouldn't be restricted to those with an interest in Hong Kong in the early 1950s, although it will give a first-hand window into those times. It is also an exceptional memoir thanks to its strongly drawn protaganist. Well worth a read.
The Don recently claimed that 70% of Hong Kongers support his newest white elephant - the Tamar government headquarters proposal. From his place on the top floor, The Don can gaze across the harbour (pollution permitting) at West Kowloon and ponder what next in his edifice complex. Meanwhile, 50 floors below in the basement, LegCo members can continue lamenting their low pay and why they should at least earn as much as the civil servants they question in LegCo sessions. It's all about respect, you see.
But how did the government discover this magical 70%? Was it through a scientific polling of the public? Or an ad hoc exercise in working backwards from a result? The SCMP yesterday:
A senior official yesterday refused to be drawn on the basis for Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen's claim that there was 70 per cent support for the Tamar project. Speaking on a radio phone-in programme, Director of Administration Elizabeth Tse Man-yee said the figure was the sum of different opinions collected through various channels. "Over the past few months, we have done internal analysis," she said. "We also paid attention to newspaper editorials, letters from the public, and people who made calls to radio phone-in programmes. We gathered and organised all this information.
"We have scientific grounds to do our analysis. We understand the public has different views about Tamar. We've also refined our project according to the feedback. "We've reduced development density and maximised opportunities for public enjoyment of Victoria Harbour. We've responded to public worries."
Ms Tse's comment came a day after a poll of 1,033 people, commissioned by the South China Morning Post, found only 28.1 per cent wanted a government complex to be built at Tamar.
Ms Tse said the poll result reflected the government's findings, as 28 per cent indicated the site should be a venue for recreation and cultural events while 26.4 per cent wanted a green park. "When we look at the reality, over half of the Tamar development project is for recreational land use," she said, referring to the government's plan that over half of the space at Tamar will be open.
Will the government release the detailed compilation of these numbers? Would such a slap-dash approach even pass muster in local high schools? What will ESWN say? And if this is how the government conducts surveys, perhaps Hong Kong's a better place without such democracy.
What I thought was really interesting was the press coverage of this story. Or, actually, the lack of press coverage.
The Standard had two stories in two days about the government claims and the challenge to do a poll and the opponents of the project calling the Don's bluff on the poll. But they never followed up with the results of this poll that showed the Don was pulling numbers out of his...
Could say the same thing about the way the Don was (ab)using numbers back in December to claim majority support for his lack of vision on Constitutional reform. (see the latest poll numbers on Hong Kong's thoughts on being prepared for universal suffrage)
Today's SCMP front page: Tsang's pick shunned so he'll ask Hui to stay
The Don wants his mate John Tsang, who took a demotion in order to line up for the Chief Secretary job. But Mr Tsang worked for the hated Chris Patten for a couple of years, which makes him ineligible in the eyes of those who really run Hong Kong. Rafael Hui, the incumbent, has consistently said he wants to quit in June 2007. So we're going to have a Chief Secretary who doesn't want to be there, a Chief Executive who can't get his candidate up and an administration that is taking it as read that it will still be running the place after the supposed Chief Executive election next year.
Wouldn't it be cheaper if we gave up the pretence and let Beijing actually run Hong Kong?
But to Simon's point, that would damage the ''collective manipulated psyche'' of the Chinese people, as Lung Ying-tai has called it. China, like many dictatorships, relies on keeping up the illusory double standards, the famous ''children raised on wolf's milk'' idea that led to the Freezing Point closure a while back.
If they manipulated those manipulated by bringing too much truth into the system, then they'd really have a case on their hands. As I've lived in Hong Kong for four years, I've learned that people here get by on illusion.
There's no h ousing bubble!
There's no dictatorship!
There's nothing here but freedom and democracy, it's just inept leaders who are too immature to run Hong Kong, ''a unique place'' in the world, where universals like truth, justice and equality don't bear out.
Hi Simon, congratulations on the newest member of your clan. You are contributing more towards the local birthrate than six average Hong Kong-born local couples!
Read the whole thing [the Slate article] for an assesment of China's true capabilities. Even more important is that rich, capitalist nations are much less dangerous than poor, communist nations. Consider how well China has treated Hong Kong. Moreover, democracy will not be long in coming to China.
My emphasis. The democracy point one can argue - for mine the CCP have enough of a grip to continue walking the tightrope between hardline political control but some kind of capitalist market economy.
Far more worthy of discussion is the statement (without any supporting evidence) Consider how well China has treated Hong Kong. One could certainly argue that one. China has partially let Hong Kong get on with things since 1997 under the "one country, two systems" formula, but only within certain bounds. There have been several "interpretations" of the Basic Law by the NPC, ignoring or contradicting locally made legal and/or political decisions. While not openly admitted, a system of self-censorship exists in the media and politics when it comes to "sensitive" topics. Sure the PLA aren't marching down Lockhart Rd., but they don't need to. Hong Kong needs China far more than China needs Hong Kong - witness the perpetual hand wringing by Hong Kong's worthies over the Big Lychee's place in the Motherland. In the 10 years since China took over, the city has had the Asia crisis, Tung Che-hwa, the Article 23 marches, the right of abode cases, the controversy over Donald Tsang's appointment, the ridiculous rotten boroughs of the functional Legco constituencies, SARS and more.
I throw the question open to my wise readership - how well has China governed Hong Kong?
China has muddled through on Hong Kong, avoiding embarrassment I think on most issues save the rule of law, which judging from the reversals of the Court of Final Appeal decision and the 're-interpretations' of the Basic Law they have yet to grasp. But thankfully for them, some of the more behind-the-scenes harebrained decisions the Beijing leadership have made simply appeared to the local public and to everyone else as the incompetent positions of Tung Chee-Hwa and his apparatchiks.
In a way, while I do think Tung was not up to the political elements of his task, it was also very convenient for China to have their proxy be their scapegoat.
I'll dispute your premise that Hong Kong needs China more than China needs Hong Kong.
The handwringing is a non-issue that provides the Central Government the opportunity to be the nice guys for the people of Hong Kong. "We still love you, guys. We'll never forget you and Hong Kong will always hold a special place in the Chinese economy." Meanwhile the handwringers here are actively moving their investments from Hong Kong to the mainland.
And for the CCP, which depends on economic growth to buy a level of complacency/loyalty from the masses in exchange for retaining a monopoly on power, the need for this constant flow of capital and investment from Hong Kong to China is crucial.
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I read with interest an article in today's [unlinkable] SCMP about how locally, Wharf Cable is being circumvented as the sole source of broadcasting the World Cup 2006 from Germany. Many people, including myself, have actually watched football matches live without subscribing to Cable TV, simply by making proper use of our broadband connection. Services like TV Ants, or PP Live, for instance, are broadcasting football feeds taken from stations from around the world (but almost entirely from China, many of which are on a peer-to-peer network basis). However, the big question was, is it legal? A government spokesman from the Intellectual Property Department has said that it was legal to watch it, as long as it is just streaming and you do not actually record the games.
I found this most interesting. It is probably illegal to upload a stream from a cable tv box, because chances are that whoever is doing it does not have permission from their own cable TV partner. It is also illegal to record, because then you would be inferring that you had a private right to own that content (all it would take would be a simple download of video capture software from the Internet). But it is apparently perfectly legal to just watch online.
Now I got into this because the building I live in, which is in Cyberport, was developed by PCCW, who naturally were slow in allowing Wharf Cable, which competes with PCCW's own NOW Broadband TV, to run cable into our building. So short of turning up in a Wanchai bar every time I wanted to watch a match, I desperately tried to find ways of watching a streaming version of matches played by my beloved Arsenal team. And that is how I stumbled upon this service, which provides a wide variety of mainland and even other cable TV feeds (HBO, CNN, etc). There are also websites whose sole purpose is to figure out in advance the Byzantine programming arrangements of say, a sports channel in Guangdong, and can tell you with certainty when and on which mainland stations those matches will be broadcast. It goes without saying that you can do this anywhere in the world with your broadband connection, not just in Hong Kong.
I have found thereby that Chinese gray-market ingenuity has engendered a viewing population on Broadband TV that would otherwise not exist, and has succeeded where so many other broadcasters have failed. The key, obviously, is having content people will pay for...
I've got the same issues with attempting to watch the NHL's Stanley Cup playoffs. Although I cannot find the streaming sites, I have been able to find a multitude of torrent sites to which I (yes, I am a criminal), dnld the games to watch at home.
It is the only thing that keeps me sane with a channel selection at my housing estate of ESPN (stolen from a Thai sattelite), CNN (Stolen from Philippines sattelite), BBC, Star World, Star Sports, Disney (absolutely horrid programming), HBO (which only shows the worst of worst movies from the 70's and 80's) and the two HK English language channels which are flooded with Mandarin language info-mercials at every turn of programming the govt doesn't deem acceptable.
Yes GZ Expat, technology is beautiful. There must be some way, somewhere, to find the hockey that you need, particularly now late in the playoffs, legally. I have been astounded in how I can watch obscure Sutch football teams playing each other, and I've certainly also found ways to watch NFL or MLB.
Now should we blame the upcoming technology or the people if they are trying to record the telecast? Even if its illegal, provided, why should anyone lag behind in taking its full advantage.
Fans from all walks of life are passionate about FIFA World Cup. Celebrities too devote themselves to the beautiful game. Then wats the harm in watching live through broadband connection, even if its illegal.
“Chiuchow people are the Jews of China,” Boris informs us. “They make lots of money. So they like to renovate temples like this to give everyone the impression that they are honourable.”
George Friedman from Stratfor talks about the US perceptions of a Chinese threat. Whether you agree or not, it's cetainly thought provoking:
The U.S. Department of Defense released its annual report on China's military last week. The Pentagon reported that China is moving forward rapidly with an offensive capability in the Pacific. The capability would not, according to the report, rely on the construction of a massive fleet to counter U.S. naval power, but rather on development and deployment of anti-ship missiles and maritime strike aircraft, some obtained from Russia. According to the Pentagon report, the Chinese are rapidly developing the ability to strike far into the Pacific -- as far as the Marianas and Guam, which houses a major U.S. naval base.
Whether the Chinese actually are constructing this force is less important than that the United States believes the Chinese are doing this. This analysis is not confined to the Defense Department but has been the view of much of the U.S. intelligence community. There is, therefore, a consensus in Washington that the Chinese are moving far beyond defensive capabilities or deterrence: They are moving toward a strike capability against the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
If this analysis is correct, then the reason for U.S. concern is obvious. Ever since World War II, the United States has dominated all of the world's oceans. Following that war, the Japanese and German navies were gone. The British and French did not have the economic ability or political will to maintain a global naval force. The Soviets had a relatively small navy, concerned primarily with coastal defense. The only power with a global navy was the United States -- and the U.S. Navy's power was so overwhelming that no combination of navies could challenge its maritime hegemony.
In an odd way, this extraordinary geopolitical reality has been taken for granted by many. No naval force in history has been as powerful as the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy does not have the ability to be everywhere at all times -- but it does have the ability to be in multiple places at the same time, and to move about without concerns of being challenged. This means, quite simply, that the United States can invade other countries, anywhere in the world, but other countries cannot invade the United States. Whatever the outcome of the invasion once ashore, the United States has conducted the Iraq, Kosovo, Somali, Gulf and Vietnamese wars without ever having to fight to protect lines of supply and communications. It has been able to impose naval blockades at will, without having to fight sea battles to achieve them. It is this single fact that, more than any other, has shaped global history since 1945.
The rest is continued below the jump.
.
Following the Soviet Strategy?
The Soviets fully understood the implications of U.S. naval power. They recognized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the United States would have to convoy massive reinforcements across the Atlantic. If the Soviets could cut that line of supply, Europe would be isolated. The Soviets had ambitious goals for naval construction, designed to challenge the United States in the Atlantic. But naval construction is fiendishly expensive. The Soviets simply couldn't afford the cost of building a fleet to challenge the U.S. Navy, while also building a ground force to protect their vast periphery from NATO and China.
Instead of trying to challenge the United States in surface warfare, using aircraft carriers, the Soviets settled for a strategy that relied on attack submarines and maritime bombers, like the Backfire. The Soviet view was that they did not have to take control of the Atlantic themselves; rather, if they could deny the United States access to the Atlantic, they would have achieved their goal. The plan was to attack the convoys and their escorts, using attack submarines and missiles launched from Backfire bombers that would come down into the Atlantic through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The American counter was a strong anti-submarine warfare capability, coupled with the Aegis anti-missile system. Who would have won the confrontation is an interesting question to argue. The war everyone planned for never happened.
Today, it appears to be the Pentagon's view that China is following the Soviet model. The Chinese will not be able to float a significant surface challenge to the U.S. Seventh Fleet for at least a generation -- if then. It is not just a question of money or even technology; it also is a question of training an entirely new navy in extraordinarily complex doctrines. The United States has been operating carrier battle groups since before World War II. The Chinese have never waged carrier warfare or even had a significant surface navy, for that matter -- certainly not since being defeated by Japan in 1895.
The Americans think that the Chinese counter to U.S. capabilities, like the Soviet counter, will not be to force a naval battle. Rather, China would use submarines and, particularly, anti-ship missiles to engage the U.S. Navy. In other words, the Chinese are not interested in seizing control of the Pacific from the Americans. What they want to do is force the U.S. fleet out of the Western Pacific by threatening it with ground- and air-launched missiles that are sufficiently fast and agile to defeat U.S. fleet defenses.
Such a strategy presents a huge problem for the United States. The cost of threatening a fleet is lower than the cost of protecting one. The acquisition of high-speed, maneuverable missiles would cost less than purchasing defense systems. The cost of a carrier battle group makes its loss devastating. Therefore, the United States cannot afford to readily expose the fleet to danger. Thus, given the central role that control of the seas plays in U.S. grand strategy, the United States inevitably must interpret the rapid acquisition of anti-ship technologies as a serious threat to American geopolitical interests.
Planning for the Worst
The question to begin with, then, is why China is pursuing this strategy. The usual answer has to do with Taiwan, but China has far more important issues to deal with than Taiwan. Since 1975, China has become a major trading country. It imports massive amounts of raw materials and exports huge amounts of manufactured goods, particularly to the United States. China certainly wants to continue this trade; in fact, it urgently needs to. At the same time, China is acutely aware that its economy depends on maritime trade -- and that its maritime trade must pass through waters controlled entirely by the U.S. Navy.
China, like all countries, has a nightmare scenario that it guards against. If the United States' dread is being denied access to the Western Pacific and all that implies, the Chinese nightmare is an American blockade. The bulk of China's exports go out through major ports like Hong Kong and Shanghai. From the Chinese point of view, the Americans are nothing if not predictable. The first American response to a serious political problem is usually economic sanctions, and these frequently are enforced by naval interdiction. Given the imbalance of naval power in the South China Sea (and the East China Sea as well), the United States could impose a blockade on China at will.
Now, the Chinese cannot believe that the United States currently is planning such a blockade. At the same time, the consequences of such a blockade would be so devastating that China must plan out the counter to it, under the doctrine of hoping for the best and planning for the worst. Chinese military planners cannot assume that the United States will always pursue accommodating policies toward Beijing. Therefore, China must have some means of deterring an American move in this direction. The U.S. Navy must not be allowed to approach China's shores. Therefore, Chinese war gamers obviously have decided that engagement at great distance will provide forces with sufficient space and time to engage an approaching American fleet.
Simply building this capability does not mean that Taiwan is threatened with invasion. For an invasion to take place, the Chinese would need more than a sea-lane denial strategy. They would need an amphibious capability that could itself cross the Taiwan Strait, withstanding Taiwanese anti-ship systems. The Chinese are far from having that system. They could bombard Taiwan with missiles, nuclear and otherwise. They could attack shipping to and from Taiwan, thereby isolating her. But China does not appear to be building an amphibious force capable of landing and supporting the multiple divisions that would be needed to deal with Taiwan.
In our view, the Chinese are constructing the force that the Pentagon report describes. But we are in a classic situation: The steps that China is taking for what it sees as a defensive contingency must -- again, under the worst-case doctrine -- be seen by the United States as a threat to a fundamental national interest, control of the sea. The steps the United States already has taken in maintaining its control must, under the same doctrine, be viewed by China as holding Chinese maritime movements hostage. This is not a matter of the need for closer understanding. Both sides understand the situation perfectly: Regardless of current intent, intentions change. It is the capability, not the intention, that must be focused on in the long run.
Therefore, China's actions and America's interpretation of those actions must be taken extremely seriously over the long run. The United States is capable of threatening fundamental Chinese interests, and China is developing the capability to threaten fundamental American interests. Whatever the subjective intention of either side at this moment is immaterial. The intentions ten years from now are unpredictable.
As the Pentagon report also notes, China is turning to the Russians for technology. The Russian military might have decayed, but its weapons systems remain top-notch. The Chinese are acquiring Russian missile and aircraft technology, and they want more. The Russians, looking for every opportunity to challenge the United States, are supplying it. Now, the Chinese do not want to take this arrangement to the point that China's trade relations with the United States would be threatened, but at the same time, trade is trade and national security is national security. China is walking a fine line in challenging the United States, but it feels it will be able to pull it off -- and so far it has been right.
U.S. Defense Policy: Full Circle
The United States is now back to where it was before the 9/11 attacks. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld came into office with two views. The first was that China was the major challenge to the United States. The second was that the development of high-tech weaponry was essential to the United States. With this report, the opening views of the administration are turning into the closing views. China is again emerging as the primary challenge; the only solution to the Chinese challenge is in technology.
It should be added that the key to this competition will be space. For the Chinese, the challenge will not be solely in hitting targets at long range, but in seeing them. For that, space-based systems are essential. For the United States, the ability to see Chinese launch facilities is essential to suppressing fire, and space-based systems provide that ability. The control of the sea will involve agile missiles and space-based systems. China's moves into space follow logically from their strategic position. The protection of space-based systems from attack will be essential to both sides.
It is interesting to note that all of this renders the U.S.-jihadist dynamic moot. If the Pentagon believes what it has written, then the question of Afghanistan, Iraq and the rest is now passé. Al Qaeda has failed to topple any Muslim regimes, and there is no threat of the caliphate being reborn. The only interesting question in the region is whether Iran will move into an alignment with Russia, China or both.
There is an old saw that generals prepare for the last war. The old saw is frequently true. There is a belief that the future of war is asymmetric warfare, terrorism and counterinsurgency. These will always be there, but it is hard to see, from its report on China, that the Pentagon believes this is the future of war. The Chinese challenge in the Pacific dwarfs the remote odds that an Islamic, land-based empire could pose a threat to U.S. interests. China cannot be dealt with through asymmetric warfare. The Pentagon is saying that the emerging threat is from a peer -- a nuclear power challenging U.S. command of the sea.
Each side is defensive at the moment. Each side sees a long-term possibility of a threat. Each side is moving to deflect that threat. This is the moment at which conflicts are incubated.U.S. Perceptions of a Chinese Threat
By George Friedman
The U.S. Department of Defense released its annual report on China's military last week. The Pentagon reported that China is moving forward rapidly with an offensive capability in the Pacific. The capability would not, according to the report, rely on the construction of a massive fleet to counter U.S. naval power, but rather on development and deployment of anti-ship missiles and maritime strike aircraft, some obtained from Russia. According to the Pentagon report, the Chinese are rapidly developing the ability to strike far into the Pacific -- as far as the Marianas and Guam, which houses a major U.S. naval base.
Whether the Chinese actually are constructing this force is less important than that the United States believes the Chinese are doing this. This analysis is not confined to the Defense Department but has been the view of much of the U.S. intelligence community. There is, therefore, a consensus in Washington that the Chinese are moving far beyond defensive capabilities or deterrence: They are moving toward a strike capability against the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
If this analysis is correct, then the reason for U.S. concern is obvious. Ever since World War II, the United States has dominated all of the world's oceans. Following that war, the Japanese and German navies were gone. The British and French did not have the economic ability or political will to maintain a global naval force. The Soviets had a relatively small navy, concerned primarily with coastal defense. The only power with a global navy was the United States -- and the U.S. Navy's power was so overwhelming that no combination of navies could challenge its maritime hegemony.
In an odd way, this extraordinary geopolitical reality has been taken for granted by many. No naval force in history has been as powerful as the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy does not have the ability to be everywhere at all times -- but it does have the ability to be in multiple places at the same time, and to move about without concerns of being challenged. This means, quite simply, that the United States can invade other countries, anywhere in the world, but other countries cannot invade the United States. Whatever the outcome of the invasion once ashore, the United States has conducted the Iraq, Kosovo, Somali, Gulf and Vietnamese wars without ever having to fight to protect lines of supply and communications. It has been able to impose naval blockades at will, without having to fight sea battles to achieve them. It is this single fact that, more than any other, has shaped global history since 1945.
Following the Soviet Strategy?
The Soviets fully understood the implications of U.S. naval power. They recognized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the United States would have to convoy massive reinforcements across the Atlantic. If the Soviets could cut that line of supply, Europe would be isolated. The Soviets had ambitious goals for naval construction, designed to challenge the United States in the Atlantic. But naval construction is fiendishly expensive. The Soviets simply couldn't afford the cost of building a fleet to challenge the U.S. Navy, while also building a ground force to protect their vast periphery from NATO and China.
Instead of trying to challenge the United States in surface warfare, using aircraft carriers, the Soviets settled for a strategy that relied on attack submarines and maritime bombers, like the Backfire. The Soviet view was that they did not have to take control of the Atlantic themselves; rather, if they could deny the United States access to the Atlantic, they would have achieved their goal. The plan was to attack the convoys and their escorts, using attack submarines and missiles launched from Backfire bombers that would come down into the Atlantic through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The American counter was a strong anti-submarine warfare capability, coupled with the Aegis anti-missile system. Who would have won the confrontation is an interesting question to argue. The war everyone planned for never happened.
Today, it appears to be the Pentagon's view that China is following the Soviet model. The Chinese will not be able to float a significant surface challenge to the U.S. Seventh Fleet for at least a generation -- if then. It is not just a question of money or even technology; it also is a question of training an entirely new navy in extraordinarily complex doctrines. The United States has been operating carrier battle groups since before World War II. The Chinese have never waged carrier warfare or even had a significant surface navy, for that matter -- certainly not since being defeated by Japan in 1895.
The Americans think that the Chinese counter to U.S. capabilities, like the Soviet counter, will not be to force a naval battle. Rather, China would use submarines and, particularly, anti-ship missiles to engage the U.S. Navy. In other words, the Chinese are not interested in seizing control of the Pacific from the Americans. What they want to do is force the U.S. fleet out of the Western Pacific by threatening it with ground- and air-launched missiles that are sufficiently fast and agile to defeat U.S. fleet defenses.
Such a strategy presents a huge problem for the United States. The cost of threatening a fleet is lower than the cost of protecting one. The acquisition of high-speed, maneuverable missiles would cost less than purchasing defense systems. The cost of a carrier battle group makes its loss devastating. Therefore, the United States cannot afford to readily expose the fleet to danger. Thus, given the central role that control of the seas plays in U.S. grand strategy, the United States inevitably must interpret the rapid acquisition of anti-ship technologies as a serious threat to American geopolitical interests.
Planning for the Worst
The question to begin with, then, is why China is pursuing this strategy. The usual answer has to do with Taiwan, but China has far more important issues to deal with than Taiwan. Since 1975, China has become a major trading country. It imports massive amounts of raw materials and exports huge amounts of manufactured goods, particularly to the United States. China certainly wants to continue this trade; in fact, it urgently needs to. At the same time, China is acutely aware that its economy depends on maritime trade -- and that its maritime trade must pass through waters controlled entirely by the U.S. Navy.
China, like all countries, has a nightmare scenario that it guards against. If the United States' dread is being denied access to the Western Pacific and all that implies, the Chinese nightmare is an American blockade. The bulk of China's exports go out through major ports like Hong Kong and Shanghai. From the Chinese point of view, the Americans are nothing if not predictable. The first American response to a serious political problem is usually economic sanctions, and these frequently are enforced by naval interdiction. Given the imbalance of naval power in the South China Sea (and the East China Sea as well), the United States could impose a blockade on China at will.
Now, the Chinese cannot believe that the United States currently is planning such a blockade. At the same time, the consequences of such a blockade would be so devastating that China must plan out the counter to it, under the doctrine of hoping for the best and planning for the worst. Chinese military planners cannot assume that the United States will always pursue accommodating policies toward Beijing. Therefore, China must have some means of deterring an American move in this direction. The U.S. Navy must not be allowed to approach China's shores. Therefore, Chinese war gamers obviously have decided that engagement at great distance will provide forces with sufficient space and time to engage an approaching American fleet.
Simply building this capability does not mean that Taiwan is threatened with invasion. For an invasion to take place, the Chinese would need more than a sea-lane denial strategy. They would need an amphibious capability that could itself cross the Taiwan Strait, withstanding Taiwanese anti-ship systems. The Chinese are far from having that system. They could bombard Taiwan with missiles, nuclear and otherwise. They could attack shipping to and from Taiwan, thereby isolating her. But China does not appear to be building an amphibious force capable of landing and supporting the multiple divisions that would be needed to deal with Taiwan.
In our view, the Chinese are constructing the force that the Pentagon report describes. But we are in a classic situation: The steps that China is taking for what it sees as a defensive contingency must -- again, under the worst-case doctrine -- be seen by the United States as a threat to a fundamental national interest, control of the sea. The steps the United States already has taken in maintaining its control must, under the same doctrine, be viewed by China as holding Chinese maritime movements hostage. This is not a matter of the need for closer understanding. Both sides understand the situation perfectly: Regardless of current intent, intentions change. It is the capability, not the intention, that must be focused on in the long run.
Therefore, China's actions and America's interpretation of those actions must be taken extremely seriously over the long run. The United States is capable of threatening fundamental Chinese interests, and China is developing the capability to threaten fundamental American interests. Whatever the subjective intention of either side at this moment is immaterial. The intentions ten years from now are unpredictable.
As the Pentagon report also notes, China is turning to the Russians for technology. The Russian military might have decayed, but its weapons systems remain top-notch. The Chinese are acquiring Russian missile and aircraft technology, and they want more. The Russians, looking for every opportunity to challenge the United States, are supplying it. Now, the Chinese do not want to take this arrangement to the point that China's trade relations with the United States would be threatened, but at the same time, trade is trade and national security is national security. China is walking a fine line in challenging the United States, but it feels it will be able to pull it off -- and so far it has been right.
U.S. Defense Policy: Full Circle
The United States is now back to where it was before the 9/11 attacks. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld came into office with two views. The first was that China was the major challenge to the United States. The second was that the development of high-tech weaponry was essential to the United States. With this report, the opening views of the administration are turning into the closing views. China is again emerging as the primary challenge; the only solution to the Chinese challenge is in technology.
It should be added that the key to this competition will be space. For the Chinese, the challenge will not be solely in hitting targets at long range, but in seeing them. For that, space-based systems are essential. For the United States, the ability to see Chinese launch facilities is essential to suppressing fire, and space-based systems provide that ability. The control of the sea will involve agile missiles and space-based systems. China's moves into space follow logically from their strategic position. The protection of space-based systems from attack will be essential to both sides.
It is interesting to note that all of this renders the U.S.-jihadist dynamic moot. If the Pentagon believes what it has written, then the question of Afghanistan, Iraq and the rest is now passé. Al Qaeda has failed to topple any Muslim regimes, and there is no threat of the caliphate being reborn. The only interesting question in the region is whether Iran will move into an alignment with Russia, China or both.
There is an old saw that generals prepare for the last war. The old saw is frequently true. There is a belief that the future of war is asymmetric warfare, terrorism and counterinsurgency. These will always be there, but it is hard to see, from its report on China, that the Pentagon believes this is the future of war. The Chinese challenge in the Pacific dwarfs the remote odds that an Islamic, land-based empire could pose a threat to U.S. interests. China cannot be dealt with through asymmetric warfare. The Pentagon is saying that the emerging threat is from a peer -- a nuclear power challenging U.S. command of the sea.
Each side is defensive at the moment. Each side sees a long-term possibility of a threat. Each side is moving to deflect that threat. This is the moment at which conflicts are incubated.
The key question here, of course, is whether the Pentagon is correct in assuming that China is a more serious threat to American interests than the kind of thing we all witnessed on 9/11, 7/7, etc. Given some of the thinking that has come out of the Pentagon in recent years, I think there is more than adequate reason to deconstruct their thought process in this regard.
For those who are not married to a particular viewpoint on this question, I'd suggest picking up "The Pentagon's New Map" by Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett. Immensely readable, Barnett (a former wonk in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and professor at the Naval War College) proposes a very different view of China and the threats the U.S. and the rest of the developed world face than what you hear espoused by the Pentagon brass.
He also lays out a strategic vision that would deal with the core causes of terrorism while shifting China from a potential threat to a strategic ally. Given that Barnett started at Harvard as a specialist on the USSR, he quotes chapter and verse as to why China is not The Soviet Threat, Mark II Mod 0.
People will take different sides, but I'm of the opinion that it's better to avoid Cold War II than worry so much about winning it that we make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. What a remarkable waste of lives and treasure that would be when we have a host of other, more pressing geopolitical hairballs staring us in the face.
I agree, Barnett is interesting. A little lacking when it comes to specifics though- funny how when you think of his USSR background his economic determinism makes sense, but I digress. Just curious David, what other pressing geopolitical hairballs that are staring us in the face did you have in mind?
The interesting thing about this article to me is not just the 'they're doing this and that', but the downplay of current actions in the Middle East and such. The evolution of China's modern return to front seats along with the maturation of America as the world's dominant power will be a contentious issue in the years to come, even if we are able to avoid a Hot war. As things are at the moment, the only opponent of a real War of the future would be China; but if we do avoid that (as I hope all rational people do), how will we manage it from both sides and other countries in the world? Assuredly not an easy task. Can we avoid both a Hot war and a Cold war?
Maybe it's me, but I think Barnett gets as specific as he needs to be. On the other hand, I'm a businessman, not an economist or a political scientist, so I'm holding him to a different standard than others might.
I'll try to be a bit more specific vis-a-vis the above mentioned geopolitical hairballs that should be attracting the interest of strategists and policymakers before they start worrying about fabricating the next "strategic competitor." None of this is original, but it makes an imposing list, working my way slowly around the world from the 180th meridian in a westward direction:
1. A Nuclear North Korea
2. The unfinished revolution in Indonesia
3. A weakened state in Thailand threatened by Karens in the west and Muslims in the South
4. A feeble state and ongoing factionalism in Afganistan
5. The looming uncertainty of post-Putin Russia
6. Dealing with an (eventually) nuclear and fundamentalist Iran
7. Strengthening the nascent state in Iraq and ending the insurgency there.
8. The impending challenge to the House of Saud on the Arabian peninsula.
9. Turning Israel and Palestine into viable, prosperous neighbors.
10. Addressing the issue of Kurds in Asia Minor generally, but specifically in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.
11. Ending the genocide and violence on the Horn of Africa
12. Bringing lasting peace and prosperity to the Balkans
13. Managing the complex challenges of Sub-Saharan Africa
14. The insurgency and weak state in Columbia.
15. Mexico's soft underbelly (Chiapas, et al.)
The list could go on and could get even more speculative, but I think you get my point. If I were in one of those conference rooms on the E-Ring of the Pentagon rather than here in the Hutong in Beijing, I'd look at the globe and find a lot of places from which threats to the international system could emerge that are far more urgent than the distant potential of China as anything more than a military paper tiger.
The point is simply this - in this scary new world, China can either be a friend like the U.K. was during the Cold War, or it can be an enemy and a comfort to all of the bad actors in the world. We can either try to engage as allies in the process, seeking to support each other as our nations and the world undergo a huge transition, or we can piss each other off and 15-20 years from now be right back where we were in the late 1970s.
Great power realists will have you believe that China and the U.S. MUST become enemies simply because "the two biggest guys on the block eventually have to fight." I say that's simplistic nonsense, and dangerous to boot. 2006 is not 1945.
Nukes also change the picture dramatically. Although if you believe the article in the Mar/Apr 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs, "The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy", bu Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, the USA effectively has a nuclear monopoly over the PRC. (China only has 20 missiles capable of hitting the US, so if the US can locate and destroy these by rapid first strike, the US wins by default. Chinese missiles are old and require 1 hour to refuel before being ready for launch, US ones can be fired from missiles, submarines, or dropped from strategic bombers).
China's 18 ICBMs, sitting unfueled in their silos, their nuclear warheads in storage, are essentially the same as they were the day China began deploying them in 1981.
...
This minimal arsenal is clearly a matter of choice: China stopped fissile material production in 1990 and has long had the capacity to produce a much larger number of ballistic missiles. The simplest explanation for this choice is that the Chinese leadership worries less about its vulnerability to a disarming first strike than the costs of an arms race or what some Second Artillery officer might do with a fully armed nuclear weapon. In a strange way, Beijing placed more faith in Washington